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DICTA

Some Problems Concerning Oil and Gas Leases
And the Rule Against Perpetuities
By HOVER T. LENTZ
of the Denver Bar*

In 1620 the Court of King's Bench held that an executory interest limited
upon a freehold estate was indestructible.' Having recognized such an indestructible interest, the courts then decided that this principle should not be
allowed to go too far toward tying-up property. Thus in 1682 in the now
famous Duke of Norfolk's Case 2 the character of the modern rule against
perpetuities as a rule which prohibited remotely contingent future interests
was first clearly laid down. As stated by Professor Gray the rule is: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." 3 How does this fundamental rule of property law affect modern versions of oil and gas leases?
Technically, the rule is applied only to the vesting of'a future interest
although many courts loosely apply the rule to such related problems as the
permissible duration of private trusts and the permissible period of suspension
of the absolute power of alienation. The situation is further clouded by the
application of statutes in various states. The scope of this paper will be
limited mainly to the application of the rule in its technical sense.
The application of the rule to oil and gas leases arises chiefly from the
theory of vesting pronounced in the early case of Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts.4
It was there determined that an oil and gas lessee obtained no vested interest under the lease itself until oil or gas is discovered. 5 This principle
naturally led to the contention that interests vested by certain types of oil gas
leases were void as violative of the rule against perpetuities.
Assuming the soundness of such theory, it appears that the following
types of leases would violate the rule: (1) a lease of the "no term" type
used in connection with an "unless" drilling clause, 6 and (2) a lease which
uses the "unless" drilling clause in connection with a term of more than
twenty-one years. In either of these cases it is possible that the vesting of
the lessee's interest on the discovery of oil can be -postponed for a period
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of law.
'Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
23 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
'Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed., 1942) sec. 201.
4 152 Pa. 451, 25 Atd 732 (1893).
'The court said: "The title (in any oil lease) is inchoate, and for purposes of exploration only until oil is found. If it is not found, no estate vests in the lessee, and his
title, whatever it is, ends when the unsuccessful search is abandoned. If oil is found,
then the right to produce becomes a vested right * * *'"
'i.e., a provision that if the lessee does not drill within a specified time, the lease
is to terminate, unless the lessee pays certain sums periodically in advance to keep the
lease alive.
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beyond lives in being plus twenty-one years for, under such leases, the lessee
may delay drilling indefinitely by the payment of a periodic rental. The
lessee thus has what amounts to a perpetual option to drill7 or not to drill,
and perpetual options are generally held to violate the rule.
The validity of the "no term" lease was first questioned under the rule
against perpetuities in Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.," where the court held that
the rule was not violated by a lease for a period of five years and as much
longer as either oil or gas was produced, with the further stipulation that the
lessee could pay a yearly rental indefinitely in lieu of drilling. The court
reasoned that there was nothing in the lease to deny the lessor an implied
right to terminate the lease upon reasonable notice. This is clearly unsound
and the great weight of modern authority refuses to imply a condition in a
lease against delay in development in direct contravention of an express provision providing for such delay. 9
Recent Decisions Side-Step Issue
The rule pronounced in the Venture Oil case 0 has, however, been generally repudiated in recent decisions, and the present tendency is to hold that
immediately upon the execution of an oil and gas lease some sort of estate or
interest vests in the lessee,' thus sidestepping the problem raised by the
Venture Oil decision.

Another question arises in connection with leases providing for perpetual
renewal. Such a covenant, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, is gen12
erally held valid on the theory that it is a part of the lessee's present interest,
and so there is no remote vesting.
Thus the universal provision for a primary term and as "long thereafter
as either oil or gas is or can be produced from any well on said land" is no
13
longer subject to question in most jurisdictions.
' Starcher Bros. v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 371, 56 S. E. 527 (1907) (action for specific
performance); Eastman Marble Co. v. Verft.ont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 N. E.
177 (1920) (action for damages). The effect of these cases is that neither an action for
damages nor an action for specific performance may be maintained on a perpetual option.
See also 162 ALR 581.
'78 W. Va. 329, 88 S. E. 1075 (1916).
Summers, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS (perm. ed., 1942) sec. 397 and numerous
cases cited therein.
"Note 4, supra.
" Rosson v. Bennett, Tex. Civ. App. 1927, 294 S. W. 660; Summers, THE LAW
OF OIL AND GAS (perm. ed., 1942) sec. 171.
"Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E. 983, 3 A.L.R. 495 (1914); Becker v.
Submarine Oil Co., 55 Cal. App. 698, 204 Pac. 245 (1924); 3 A.L.R. 498; 39 A.L.R.
280; 162 A.L.R. 1147; Contra: Morrison v. Rossignol, 5 Cal. 64 (1855).
"Weber v. Texas Co., 83 F. (2d) 807 (C.C.A., 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
561, 57 S. St. 23, 81 L. Ed. 413, where the court said that an option given to lessee to
purchase lessor's royalty rights whenever during the duration of such a ease the lessor
should offer the same for sale "was within neither the purpose nor the reason for the
rule" against perpetuities. However, note the contentions raised in Lloyd's Estate v.
Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., infra Note 18.
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Some decisions have construed an oil and gas lease to constitute a profit
a' prendre, and in such case the rule does not usually apply since a profit is
generally a present interest in property. 14 If, however, the profit is to vest
at a future date, the rule is applicable.
Several recent cases have presented various facets of the problem. In
Francis v. Superior Oil Co. 5 the lease provided that it should remain in force
for five years from the time when the lessee could legally enter and drill,
and so long thereafter as oil or gas was produced on such land. At the time
of the execution of the lease, a city ordinance prohibited drilling on the land
in question. The court sustained the lease against the contention that it was
void for remoteness and that it violated a statute prohibiting suspension of the
power of alienation for more than twenty-one years. The court first held that
the lessee had obtained a present interest immediately upon execution of the
lease in the nature of a profit a' prendre and laid much stress on the fact
that the parties must have contemplated removal of the restriction within a
reasonable time, or, if not, a termination of the lease obligations. In fact,
the restriction was lifted within a few months and the property was drilled.
This latter reasoning seems tenuous in view of the clear principle that an instrument said to create a perpetuity is to be construed as of the time of its
effective date, and if any possibility of remoteness exists under the facts on
such date, the interest is void regardless of the intentions of the parties. 16
In this case it was very possible at the time the lease was executed that the
ordinance would not be repealed within a period of twenty-one years,' 7 and
it appears clear from the terms of the lease that the removal of the prohibition
on drilling was a condition precedent to the inception of the lessee's interest.
Even though a profit is usually not within the scope of the rule, the creation
of a profit to vest beyond the period of twenty-one years would come within
its condemnation.
But The Rule Cannot Be Ignored
Another interesting case which, although upholding the lease in issue,
indicates that the rule against perpetuities cannot be entirely ignored as far
as oil and gas leases are concerned arose in Mississippi in 1941.18 In a suit
to cancel a lease, the issue in the Venture Oil and Wilson cases was again
presented. The lease provided for a term of five years from the date of execution and "as much longer as oil, gas or either of them shall be produced from
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed., 1942) sec. 279.
102 F. (2d) 732 (C.C.A. Okla., 1939).
"Miller v. Weston, 67 Colo. 534, 189 Pac. 610 (1920) where the court said: "the
rule against perpetuities is no rule at all unless the condition required to satisfy it is
absolutely certain to take place within lives in being plus twenty-one years."
" If there are no measuring lives, then the period is twenty-one years. Closset v.
Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585, 230 Pac. 554 (1924).
" Lloyd's Estate v. Mullen Tractor & Equipment Co., 192 Miss. 62, 4 So. (2d)
282 (1941).
'5
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said lands by the lessee in paying quantities." The lessee had the option to
postpone development indefinitely by payment of annual rental and exercised
such option for several years. Cancellation was denied on appeal. The court
relied on the general propositions mentioned above that at all times there
were persons in being who could join to convey the fee, hence no restraint
upon alienation could exist, and that the rule against perpetuities was not
violated since "whatever interest was acquired by the lessee * * * by virtue
of the lease in question was conveyed to him to take effect in praesenti."
However, the fact that this case arose so recently suggests the possibility that
such' leases may still be open to attack in other jurisdictions.
The present use of pooling agreements in connection with scientific development programs gives rise to another possible application of the rule
against perpetuities. Present-day oil and gas leases frequently contain a
clause which gives to the lessee power to pool "at any time" for development
purposes all or any part of the leased land with adjacent lands owned by third
persons. Such leases further stipulate that payment of royalties on production from the pooled area will be made to the respective owners in proportion
to acreage ownership and that production from any part of the pooled acreage will satisfy rental, drilling and habendum clause obligations of all leases
within the pooled area. Such clauses may be attacked under the rule since
they give to the lessee a virtually unlimited power to create new property
interests in third persons in the land so leased at any time in the future. In
the only case found in which this issue has been litigated the result was far
from conclusive. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld such a clause in
Imes et al. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co. et al. 19 by construing the phrase
"at any time" to mean a reasonable time on the assumption that such was
the obvious intention of the parties. Therefore, the lessee's interest was not
too remote. As pointed out above by reference to Miller v. Weston, 20 this
type of reasoning is unsatisfactory since the rule against perpetuities is not
one of construction, but, on the contrary, is a strict rule of law to be strictly
applied. It is suggested that the holding in this case should be questioned and
that the practical answer is to limit the time during which the leased land
may be pooled to a period of less than twenty-one years. This would eliminate
questions regarding the possible remoteness of such pooling clauses. It should
be noted that a similar problem may arise in connection with clauses permitting the lessee to unitize the land.
In conclusion, it may be stated that the rule should be carefully considered in drafting leases which have the effect and purpose of postponing
development for an indefinite period or of giving the lessee power to place
the land in a pool or unit at any time in the indefinite future. Although many
questions appear to be settled, the applicability of the rule to oil and gas interests has not been raised in a number of important oil producing states, and
the possibility of vexatious litigation still remains.
79, 84 P. (2d) 1106 (1938).
184 Okla.
16, supra.
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